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1. Introduction
In many countries, economic and political problems have been stirring 
up social turmoil. Especially, economic problems have been epicenters 
of political earthquakes and social unrests. Social turmoil is apt to create 
unusual political climates. So-called “populism” is one of the by-products of 
such political climates. We should also notice that populism is a by-product 
of democracy itself. It has ambivalent effects to democracy. Populism could 
provide voters with an opportunity to change an existing political scene, on 
the one hand. However, on the other hand, populism could come along with 
self-righteous assertiveness and intolerance to political pluralism. How does 
this problematic side effect of populism appear? 
Mény and Surel （2002 : 2） write, “the concept ［populism］ is no longer 
used to describe, almost exclusively, Third World countries governed 
by charismatic leaders, but has increasingly been applied to situations in 
2Western Europe.” Albertazzi and McDonnell （2008: 2） argue, “since the early 
1990’s in Western Europe, populist movements have achieved their best 
ever results in countries like France, Switzerland and Denmark and have 
entered national government for the first time in state such Italy, Austria 
and the Netherland.” Instead of examining the cases in Western Europe, 
this paper1） will contribute to the study of populism by examining a non-
western and non-Third World case, a case of Japanese politics. Considering 
the simultaneous emergencies of populism in western democracies, there 
should be a common societal condition that offers populism opportunities 
to get political momentum. How can we describe the societal condition of 
contemporary populism?
To answer these research questions and meet the research purpose, we 
need a theoretical approach that has enough generality to provide scope 
for comparative studies. So, this paper will examine our case of populism 
from a sociocybernetic point of view, especially on the basis of Niklas 
Luhmann’s social systems theory, which is one of major theoretical legacies 
of sociocybernetics. While political scientists tend to focus on the ideological 
content of populism, or conceptualize populism as political discourse, 
strategy and so forth. This paper will rather pay attention to contemporary 
societal circumstances that provide fertile soil for populism and describe 
it as a complex phenomenon in the circumstances. As sociocybernetics 
shares a constructivist point of view with other sociological approaches, this 
paper observes the phenomenon “populism” and its circumstances from 
1） This paper was originally presented at the 12th International Conference 
of Sociocybernetics in Merida （Mexico） in June 2012. The author revised and 
updated many parts of the previous version for publishing in The Chuo Law 
Review.
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a constructivist point of view. This approach will shed light on societal 
conditions of contemporary populism and its constructivist dimension on the 
systemic level of society. 
2. Definitions of Populism
As many scholars say, populism is an elusive phenomenon. Ionescu and 
Gellner （1969: 1） write, “there can … be no doubt about the importance of 
populism. But no one is quite clear just what it is. As a doctrine or a movement, 
it is elusive and protean” （emphasis by the original authors）. Ernesto Laclau 
also states, “‘Populism’ is a concept both elusive and recurrent”（Laclau 
1977: 143）. Reviewing the history of the study of populism, Paul Taggart 
remarks, “the holy grail of a definition of populism is elusive”（Taggart 2002: 
66）. To find general concept of populism, Taggart （2000: 2 ─ 4） has pointed 
out six themes that we should consider: （1） hostility to institutionalized 
representative politics; （2） identifying itself with heartland of their idealized 
people; （3） lacking a core value or ideology; （4） coming about as a reaction 
to a sense of crisis; （5） passing as a short-term episode; （6） taking on the 
hue of its environment like a chameleon.
Referring to Taggart’s and other scholars’ work, Margaret Canovan 
distinguished two types of populism: New Populism and Politicians’ Populism 
（Canovan 2005 : 74 ─ 78）. In the former type, populists challenge existing 
political parties and claim that they are authentic representatives of the 
people who have sovereignty2）. This political attitude is also a challenge 
to institutionalized representative politics, but it （as Taggart says） lacks 
core values and takes on the hue of their environment. The latter type of 
2） The term, “New Populism” was originally discussed in Taggart （1995）. 
4populism is carried out by existing, professional politicians3）. It also bypasses 
existing divisions of political parties and traditional confrontations of 
ideologies or classes. Canovan says, “outside the USA, Politicians’ Populism is 
associated more with the weakening of traditional party structures” （Canovan 
2005: 77）. In this situation, the mass media prepares a stage of “audience 
democracy” （Manin 1997） for populist leaders. “Television maximizes the 
importance of personal leadership, allowing and encouraging leaders to 
appeal to the electorate as a whole” （Canovan 2005: 77）.
Acknowledging the elusiveness of populism, Mudde and Rovia Kaltwasser 
（2012） try to reach a “minimal definition” of populism to keep conceptual 
clarity and applicability to empirical and comparative study. They define 
populism as “thin-centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately 
separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure 
people’ and ‘the corrupt elite,’ and which argues that politics should be an 
expression of the volonté générale （general will） of the people” （Mudde and 
Rovia Kaltwasser 2012: 8）4）. In his study of nationalism, Michael Freeden used 
the term “thin-centred ideology” to describe the characteristic of nationalism 
（Freeden 1998: 750 ─ 751）. In my understanding, a thin-centred ideology is a 
patchwork of a small number of ideologies that are chosen arbitrarily for 
political purposes. So, compared to “thick” ideologies such as liberalism and 
3） Mazzoleni （2008） conceptualized this kind of populism as “soft populism”, 
in which mainstream politicians adopt softened populists attitude. Snow and 
Moffitt （2012） called the same type of populism as “mainstream populism”.
4） This definition of populism appeared first in Mudde （2004: 543）. Daniele 
Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell acknowledge that this definition is the 
most widely used definition of populism in recent years. However, they do not 
agree with the homogeneousness of the elite. Instead, they put “a set of elites 
and dangerous ‘others’” on the other side of the confrontation （Albertazzi and 
McDonnel 2015: 4─5）.
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socialism, the scope of thin-centred ideology to offer concrete and practical 
policies is limited. According to Mudde and Rovia Kaltwasser, the core 
concepts of populism are “the people”, “the elite” and “the general will.” And, 
opposites of populism are elitism and pluralism （Mudde and Rovia Kaltwasser 
2012: 9）. As cited above, in populists’ perception,  “the people” is pure and 
“the elite” is corrupt. Populists appeal that they are authentic representatives 
of “the general will” of the people. Here, it is worthwhile to note that 
Mudde and Rovia Kaltwasser grasp a moralistic nature of populism in their 
definition. They argue, “populism is in essence a form of moral politics” （Mudde 
and Rovia Kaltwasser 2012: 8, emphasis by the original authors）5）. 
There are other approaches that conceptualize populism as discourse, 
strategy, political style and so forth. Here we cannot step into an intensive 
review of various approaches to populism. However, for the purpose of this 
paper, it is worthwhile to refer to an approach that conceptualize populism 
as a political style. Jagers and Walgrave （2007: 322） proposed a thin definition 
of populism that considers it as “a political communication style of political 
actors that refer to the people.” In this definition, “political actors” include not 
only politicians but also movement leaders, interest group representatives 
and journalists. Moffitt and Tormey （2014: 387） sees populism as one of 
political styles, which are “the repertoires of performance that are used to 
create political relations.”6） Instead of the content of populist ideology, they 
focus on the performative dimension of political actions and the relationship 
between political actions and the people. They point out three elements of 
5） The moralistic nature of populism has already been noted in earlier studies. 
Peter Wiles pointed out it as one of major characteristics of populism. He 
wrote, “Populism is moralistic rather than programmatic” （Wiles 1969: 167）.
6） They argue that their definition offers larger scope for comparative analysis 
than other scholars’ definitions （Moffitt and Tormey 2014: 387）.
6populism as a political style: populists （1） appeal to “the people”, （2）get 
political momentum from the people’s perception of crisis, breakdown or 
threat, and （3） disregard the “appropriate” ways of acting and present 
themselves as “outsiders” in politics as usual （Moffitt and Tormey 2014: 391─394）.
As stated above, this paper is mainly interested in the societal 
circumstances of contemporary populism. In my view, common circumstances 
that developed democracies have been facing in these three decades are 
chronic and massive systemic crises such as growing government debts 
and economic crisis after the Lehman shock in 2008. In this paper, the 
term crisis will be used to refer to a situation described as “crisis” by its 
observers. It means that we should note how the situation is described and 
what effects the description has on the political scene. According to Niklas 
Luhmann, “crisis” is a schema that describes A as B （for instance, a drink as 
wine, a social phenomenon as a “crisis”）（Luhmann 1997: 110─111; Luhmann 2000: 300）. 
The schema “crisis” creates a pressing impression and makes people feel 
that something must be done about the situation. This paper will also use the 
term systemic crisis to refer to a crisis caused by societal subsystems——
to use the term of Luhmann’s social systems theory, functional systems——
such as economic system, political system and so forth. The following will 
serve as examples of systemic crises: the lingering recession in Japan since 
early 1990’s, the sovereign debt crisis in Europe since 2009, the political 
dysfunction such as “congressional dysfunction” over the debt-ceiling in 
the USA in 2011. Systemic crises often influence each other and deepen 
the crises: a serious economic problem stimulates the political conflict and 
weakens the government, and the political confusion worsens the situation
… In 2011, managing director of International Monetary Fund Christine 
Lagarde described the “vicious cycle” between economy and politics. “Weak 
growth and weak balance sheets—of governments, financial institutions, and 
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households—are feeding negatively on each other.” “This vicious cycle is 
gaining momentum and, frankly, it has been exacerbated by policy indecision 
and political dysfunction” （Beattie 2011）. She described the situation as an 
inter-systemic crisis caused by the economic and political system. This 
paper will call such an inter-systemic crisis involving two or more functional 
systems as a multifunctional systemic crisis.
As long as the situation described as “crisis” persists, a sense of 
urgency—— to borrow Taggart’s phrase, “a sense of crisis”——influences 
the political scene. The more serious the crisis is and the longer it persists, 
the more deeply the people’s confidence in existing political parties and 
political institutions become undermined. The important point is that the 
people think the political establishment——existing politicians especially 
who are in power——is responsible for the crisis and its persistence is a 
proof of its incompetence. The weakened confidence in politics and the 
political establishment provides budding, non-mainstream politicians with 
an opportunity to launch a political campaign as “reformers”. Such outsiders 
who have been marginalized in the political arena can reject, without 
hesitation, the existing political distinctions that have been structuring the 
political scene. For instance, Ross Perot rejected the existing party structure 
（Republicans versus Democrats） and appealed that he deserved to be the 
President during the U.S. presidential election in 1992. One of prominent 
pioneers of sociocybernetics, Gotthard Günther formulated “any value that 
does not accept the proffered choice” as a “rejection value” （Günther 1962: 
351）. In the light of the sociocybernetics view, Perot appears as a presidential 
candidate who rejected the existing two-valued choice of American politics 
and might have restructured it. 
For the purpose of this paper, it is useful to conceptualize populism as 
a style of political communication because this conceptualization connects 
8the study of populism to our constructivist point of view. In the following 
discussion, this paper treats populism as a performed style of political 
communications that rejects and restructures existing leading distinctions 
of politics by introducing the distinction: “the people” and their threat. In the 
populist style of political communications, actors speak in the name of the 
people and criticize their political targets that they are harming the people’s 
interests and rights. 
3. A Case Study: the Koizumi Administration in 2001─2006
In this section, this paper provides a case study of Japanese politics to 
discuss populism in a systemic crisis. To be specific, our case is about the 
Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s political actions and the mass 
media’s descriptions of Japanese politics in 2001─2006.
When he run for a presidential election of the Liberal Democratic Party of 
Japan （LDP）, he did not have a powerful factional base. “Insiders predicted 
Hashimoto ［former Prime Minister, his biggest rival］ would win by a large 
margin because he headed the largest LDP faction” （Bowen 2003: 44）. Koizumi 
got massive support from the rank-and-file members in primary elections of 
prefectural organizations of the LDP. LDP lawmakers could not disregard the 
result of the primaries （Park 2001: 458; Boucek 2012: 200）. Against the prediction, 
he defeated Hashimoto, who had a powerful factional base in the LDP. It 
was an unexpected victory. The Japan News described an unconventional 
character of Koizumi, “In early 2001, when he was running for the presidency 
of the LDP, Koizumi got a favorable reaction from voters by loudly declaring 
his determination to ‘destroy’ the ruling party ［LDP］ together with its 50─ 
7） Japan News. 2006. “New Govt to Address Many Issues.” August 30, p. 4.
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year history. As a result, he has been nicknamed a henjin （eccentric）.”7） 
Koizumi was not a mainstreamer in the LDP and interestingly he was an 
unconventional politician for the public. He was “known as a ‘weirdo’ within 
the party” and was “none of the above” for the rank and file （Bowen 2003: 44）. 
However, he saw himself as a reformer. He said, “people call me a ‘henjin’ 
（eccentric）, but I am a man of reform.”8） Normally, as a candidate for the 
party leader, he should have said that he would “destroy” the rival parties. 
However, he declared that he would “destroy” his party. 
This political performance has two implications. First, he ignored—rejected 
（Gotthard Günther）—the existing political distinction （confrontation） between the 
ruling party （LDP） and the oppositions. Second, he replaced the existing 
distinction with another distinction: a reformer and resistance forces. He 
criticized his opponents in the LDP and called them as “resistance forces” 
（old-guard cronies）. He restructured the political confrontation from an inter-
party struggle to an internal struggle of the LDP. Despite the eccentricity 
of his performance, his political gambits had political rationality at that time. 
The economic recession since 1990’s had completely undermined the people’s 
confidence in the ruling party （LDP）. The situation was advantageous to 
opposition parties. As a leader of the cornered ruling party, he decided 
to change uncooperative colleagues of his party into major political 
adversaries and restructured the political scene. Then, he and his party got 
an opportunity to win as a “reformer”. He was positive and negative to his 
party simultaneously. So, we can say that his performance was paradoxical. 
However, he de-paradoxized it by introducing the distinction reformer/
resistance forces. Using this distinction, Koizumi excluded a part of his 
8） Japan News, 2001. “Koizumi Becomes Icon for LDP Revival/But Flexibility 
Fails to Translate into Specific Measures.” April 25, p. 3.
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colleagues out of the party as adversaries of his reform policy.
Otake （2003） names this type of populism as “reform populism.” He 
describes it as a sort of theater democracy that uses a moral, dualistic 
rhetoric such as a good/bad-distinction9）. In May 2001, Koizumi said in the 
Diet as a new Prime Minister, “All opponents of my cabinet are resistance 
forces.” Of course, he himself is a “good” reformer and the opponents are 
“bad” old-guard conservatives （“resistance forces”）. Mass media described the 
political scene by this moral schema. This moralization and dramatization in 
the context of crisis are the characteristics of reform populism in this case. 
The approval ratings of his and his predecessor’s cabinets suggest the 
situation to which Koizumi was reacting. Koizumi succeeded his predecessor 
Yoshiro Mori （LDP） as the Prime Minister in April 2001. We can see a 
drastic change in the approval ratings of the two cabinets （see Figure 1）. The 
Mori cabinet had been suffering from low approval ratings and Koizumi 
Figure 1　Approval Ratings of Mori Cabinet and Koizumi Cabinet
Source: Japan Broadcasting Corporation Polls, Apr. 2000─Sep. 2006.
9） Otake （2006） uses “populism” just to refer to dualistic theater politics which 
uses a good/bad-distinction. Indeed, his definition fits to some Japanese cases, 
but I rather define the term more generally and specify it with adjectives such 
as “moral” to open the possibility for comparative studies of populism.
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dramatically changed the situation. In May 2001, after the presidential 
election of the LDP, The Washington Post reported, “public opinion surveys 
released this week show support for the Koizumi cabinet ranging from 85 
to 87 percent, a 50-year high for some polls. The change in public mood is 
dramatic; the approval rating of his LDP predecessor, Yoshiro Mori, had sunk 
to 8 percent”10）. Koizumi revived his party dramatically by his performance.
His political drama came to a climax with the General Election in 
September 2005. The underlying agenda of this election was an economic 
reform to overcome the lingering recession that Japan had been suffering 
since early 1990’s. Indeed, a sense of crisis had been shared in this respect 
since then. In August 2005, his postal privatization bill was rejected by 
the House of Councilors （the Upper House of the Diet）. Afterward, Koizumi 
immediately dissolved the House of Representatives （the Lower House） and 
proceeded to the General Election. He set “postal service privatization” as a 
main and only agenda of the election. Just after the dissolution of the House 
of Representatives, Koizumi said, “The Diet said postal reform isn't necessary. 
Is that really so? I want to ask the people whether they are for or against 
postal reform”, and “this election is all about postal reform.”11） He fielded 
candidates, who supported his policies, in his opponents’ constituencies as 
“political assassins” and dramatized the General Election as a fight between 
good “reformers” and bad “resistance forces” through the mass media. The 
election appeared as if it was nothing but an internal political struggle 
between pro-Koizumi faction and anti-Koizumi faction in the LDP. And, 
opposition parties were left out of the attention （Ando 2005）. Electoral analysts 
10） Washington Post. 2001. “Politics as Spectator Sport; ‘Koizumi Phenomenon’ 
Grips a Nation Used to More Reserved Leaders.” May 30, p. A─13.
11） Japan News. 2005. “Koizumi Dissolves Lower House Sept. 11 Election Set 
after Upper House rejects Postal Reform Bills.” August 09, p. 1.
12
thought that postal service privatization could not be a main agenda of the 
General Election because voters were not interested in it, and political parties 
and candidates did not take a clear stance on it （Kabashima and Sugawara 
2005）. However, it could and brought a victory to Koizumi.
4. Moral Populism and Democracy
In a democratic society, people’s choice （through an election） gives political 
and legal legitimacy to politicians as representatives of the people. Politicians 
who adopt a populist style of political communications also have to win the 
people’s support in elections. In this respect, populism does not necessarily 
harm democracy. However, as scholars say, populism is often regarded as a 
threat to democracy12）. So, the problem is how populism becomes a threat to 
democracy.
In Niklas Luhmann’s social systems theory, politics and the mass media 
are described as autonomous social systems that operate in their specific 
ways. Public opinion works as an interface between these two systems and 
their societal environment. The mass media observes politics through public 
opinion （such as polls）, and politics observes its societal environment through 
public opinion as well13）. Through public opinion, politics can observe how 
12） For example, Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser （2012: 16） say, “often populism 
is seen as a threat to democracy, undermining its key values and striving for 
an alternative, an authoritarian system.” And, Canovan also says, “populist 
movements are widely regarded, especially in Europe and Latin America, as 
threats to democracy” （Canovan 2004: 244）.
13） I use the word “societal” in the same meaning as “gesellschaftlich” in 
Luhmann’s writings. Luhmann often uses “Gesellschaft” （society） as an 
encompassing social system which includes all communications. In his writings, 
“societal （gesellschaftlich）” means related to the encompassing social system.
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the public observe itself and political issues. According to Luhmann, there 
must be two freedoms in public opinion: freedom to choose themes of 
communication and freedom to express our opinions. Luhmann defines public 
opinion as communications on political themes with these freedoms （Luhmann 
1971: 13）. Free public opinion provides the political system with enough 
complexity to deal with problems of the complex society, that is to say, the 
modern, functionally differentiated society. Otherwise, public opinion cannot 
fulfill its function by bringing various themes and opinions into political 
discussions. Above all, the moralization of political communications hinders 
this function of public opinion, because moralized communications are 
intolerant of disagreements. Moralized communications always offer “right” 
and “good” opinions. People are not expected to offer their personal opinions 
in moralized communications14）. They are expected to agree with such “right” 
and “good” opinions. Luhmann calls this non-interactive communication 
as “manipulation” （Luhmann 1971: 13）. In a democratic society, the political 
system observes public opinion and takes in the complexity of its societal 
environment. Moralized, “manipulative” communications hinder it. Populism, 
which criticizes the political establishment and appeals to the people for a 
change of politics, does not necessarily hinder the function of public opinion. 
However, when populism starts to use or is described by a moral rhetoric, it 
becomes an obstacle for free public opinion and a threat to democracy.
5. Relation between Political System and Mass Media
We can see clearly that Koizumi’s political drama was presented on the 
14） Taggart also suggests that intolerance is central to analysis of populism 
（Taggart 1995: 37）.
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screen of the mass media. Ishida （2005） critically described the relation 
between Koizumi and the mass media, especially Television as “complicity” 
after the General Election in 2005. However, this phrase is not enough to 
describe the complex relation between the political system and mass media.
The political system and mass media autonomously operate with their 
own structures that decide the fields of possibilities of their operations. 
Luhmann defines “structures” of social systems as conditions that set the 
range of possibilities of connectable operations （Luhmann 1997: 430）. Dualistic 
distinctions such as reformer/resistance forces also limit the possibilities 
of operations of the political system. So, we can see these distinctions as 
structures of the political system. 
These distinctions work as sensors to perceive differences of political 
stance that stimulate political communications. By the political distinction 
（reformer/resistance forces）, Koizumi got an opportunity to clarify who are 
his allies and enemies. Thanks to this distinction, the political system could 
reproduce political communications. The mass media prefers conflicts as 
its news stories. Conflicts provide an uncertainty of who will be a winner 
（Luhmann 1996: 59）. This political uncertainty helps the mass media to 
produce its news values. Koizumi profited from massive media coverage of 
his political performances. In this way, the political system and mass media 
operate autonomously and interrelatedly. Therefore, when politics provides 
the mass media with news materials that attract the people’s attention, there 
could be such cycle of interrelated operations.
Interestingly, Koizumi himself also had an experience to be a victim of 
moralized politics during a factional struggle in the LDP in early 1990’s. 
Koizumi said, “the mass media distinguished ‘the good’ and ‘the bad’. 
Some people refrain from making comments not to be labeled as an old-
guard crony.” A Koizumi’s political ally, Taku Yamazaki （a lawmaker, LDP） 
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said, “the mass media labeled （us） as old guard cronies and set a political 
current toward political reform. During debates in television programs, ［I 
was］ imposed to play a role of a representative of old-guard cronies. And, 
they ［“reformers”］ often said ［to me］ ‘you are wrong’.”15） We can find the 
intolerance of the moral narrative framework in this case as well. Koizumi 
might have learned the power of the framework to silence political opponents 
from his experience. As we know, the framework worked again more 
dramatically in 2000’s.
We can schematize this relation between the political system and mass 
media on the basis of Luhmann’s theoretical framework （see Figure 2）. 
Luhmann distinguishes two aspects of workings of subsystems of society, 
functional systems: function and performance. Function is a contribution 
of a subsystem to society as a whole. Performance is a contribution of a 
subsystem to its societal environment, above all, to the other subsystems 
（Luhmann 1993: 156）. The function of the political system is to provide 
Figure 2　Functions and Performances of Political System and Mass media
Society
Performances Political system
“news materials”
common realities collectively binding decisions
Functions
“materials of political 
communications”
Mass media
15） Asahi Shimbun. 1993. “A Label ‘Old-Guard Conservatives’ Has Wings 
Distinguishing Good and Bad.” November 27, p. 29. （in Jpapanese）.
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possibilities to make collectively binding decisions （Luhmann 2000: 84）. The 
function of mass media is to provide common realities that can be assumed 
as known to the public （Luhmann 1996: 120 ─ 121）. Whereas function is a 
contribution to the society as a whole, performance appears differently in 
each recipient system. For instance, the political system provides the mass 
media with facts such as political actions and comments, and the mass 
media uses some of them as news materials. Providing news materials is 
the performance of politics that appears in the mass media. The mass media 
provides common realities by disseminating information. Politics can use 
some of them in political communications. So, providing materials of political 
communications is the performance of the mass media that appears in the 
political system. On the one hand, we can describe the moralization of politics 
as mass media’s performance in the political system. Politicians can or must 
see the moralized reality as given and make political actions in consideration 
of it. However, on the other hand, we should notice that political actions 
provided by the political system enable the mass media’s performance. So, 
we should also notice that such a series of performances of the two systems 
brings about moralized politics16）. 
6. Moral Populism and Systemic Crisis
In 1991, the so-called Japanese “bubble economy” burst. Since then, 
16） Discussing American cases, Heineman （2005: 65) regards to “embrace a 
socially conservative and economically populist agenda” as moral populism. 
Moral populism in our cases brings about a division only in politicians. 
However, the American case could create a deep political rift in American 
society because issues concerning religious, moral beliefs are apt to be 
uncompromisable.
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Japan had been suffering from the lingering economic recession. It is called 
Japan’s “lost decade.” The long recession made people lose confidence in 
Japanese economy and politics, and Japanese society was filled with a feeling 
of stagnation. A phrase such as “due to the lingering recession” became 
a usual refrain of depressing news that report the rise of bankruptcies, 
unemployment rate and so forth. In fact, during a decade after the burst, 
Japan’s unemployment rate increased by 2.5 times （see Figure 3）. However, 
fortunately, it did not cause serious social unrest. So, we could say that there 
was a vague and chronic feeling of crisis. Koizumi made good use of the 
situation as a political opportunity17）. As wrote above, Koizumi became a 
leader of the ruling LDP in 2001, just after a decade since the burst. The people 
hoped him to break through the situation. He appealed that he would beat 
down the mainstreamers in his party, and presented himself as a “reformer”. 
This political action brought him high approval ratings （see Figure 1）. 
17） Mulgan （2002: 97） writes, “The Koizumi administration tried to exploit a 
sense of crisis to effect its radical reform program”.
Figure 3　Japan’s Unemployment Rate after the Collapse of the Bubble Economy
Source: Labor Force Survey, Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Public Management, Home 
               Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications
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This case suggests us a general scheme of populism under systemic crisis 
（see Figure 4）. The mass media spreads descriptions of “society in crisis”. 
The constructed and disseminated reality of “crisis” increases political 
dissatisfaction of the people and provides political challengers, in our context, 
populists with political opportunities to get political momentum. As we can 
see in the case of Japan’s “lost decade” or the global economic recession 
after the Lehman shock, systemic crises often persist for months or years. 
The persistence of crises makes people disappointed deeply at the political 
establishment and populists can make good use of the situation to gain 
political momentum. Populists criticize the political establishment for its 
incompetence and accuse it of being an obstacle of reform, a threat to the 
people’s interests. This criticism will be spread by the mass media again. And 
if the people recognize that they are facing not only an economic crisis, but 
also a political crisis because of incompetence of the political establishment, 
we can describe the situation as “multifunctional systemic crisis.” 
It is certainly true that this kind of societal process is probable in 
democratic society. However, we should notice that a strong sense of crisis 
tends to bestow strong popularity （not, legitimacy） to self-claimed reformers. 
Everyone says “agree!” to the necessity of reform. This strong popularity 
makes it easy for populists to talk assertively with, so to say, a sacred cause. 
In this situation, there could hardly be productive political competitions that 
are the foundation of democracy. When everyone agrees with the necessity 
of reform, what kind of distinction decides fates of politicians? If the answer 
is effectiveness/ineffectiveness of policies that they propose, there would still 
be a hope of handling the crisis. However, what we learned from the case of 
the Koizumi Administration was that the distinction could be moralized.
Once the leading distinction of politics is moralized, populism comes along 
with the problematic side effect. Under the situation of systemic crisis, 
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populists have opportunities to enjoy great popularity and the opponents can 
be daunted by it. In our case, the political struggle between Koizumi and his 
opponents was described by the moral, good/bad-distinction. The struggle 
was played on the screen of the mass media and followed a story line of 
popular morality play. In popular morality play, the bad （antagonist） makes 
the good （protagonist and/or innocent people） suffer at first. But, in the end 
of story, the bad is defeated and punished, and the good is rewarded with 
victory and happiness. Koizumi was rewarded with the electoral victory, 
and the opponents of the Koizumi’s reform who were cast as “the bad” were 
punished with the electoral defeats. Once the political scene begins to follow 
the story line of the morality play, a victory of “the good” （protagonist） and a 
defeat of “the bad” （antagonist） are expected by the people. In this narrative 
framework, opponents are fated to lose. There is only a little room for 
productive debates on effective policies. 
Figure 4　Populism under Systemic Crisis
Economic System
“Society in Crisis”
 Political System
e.g. recession
systemic crisis
e.g. political incompetence
communication
 Political establishment 
observation
criticize
“incompetent”
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7. Conclusion
After the end of the Cold War, classical political distinctions have lost 
their power to lead politics. Luhmann says, “Liberal and socialist parties can 
no longer offer politics which are different in principle. Equally, the schema 
conservative/progressive means little in a society which is changing so 
rapidly”（Luhmann 1998: 7）. After “the end of great narratives” （Jean-François 
Lyotard）, politicians and political parties are contesting one another not over 
the superiority of their principles or ideologies, but over the superiority of 
their performances to the societal environment. So, they have become more 
vulnerable to the societal （especially economic） disturbance. This eagerness for 
performance is true for not only politics, but also other functional systems. 
Luhmann writes, “the efforts made mainly for performance enhancement 
make functional systems more sensitive to their environment” （Luhmann 1997: 
793）. Concerning politics, the vulnerability of political systems offers fertile 
soil for populism. Political challengers can make use of the vulnerability to 
push mainstreamers into a corner by criticizing their poor performances.
However, populism does not necessarily become a threat to democracy. 
It is a style of political campaign in contemporary liberal democratic society. 
Populists appeal to the people that they are authentic representatives of their 
will and seek support from them through the mass media. And, if they win 
elections, they will become a new political power and change a political scene. 
It is a probable political strategy to change a political scene in free and open 
society18）. However, once populists or the mass media start to use a moral 
18） In this point, it is interesting to examine if populism could be a political style 
of “insurgent politics” in the developed network society. Castells suggests the 
potential of populism for a regeneration of democracy （Castells 2009: 297）.
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distinction, populism becomes problematic. As we have seen in our case, the 
moral narrative framework tends to silence political opponents of populists 
and push them into a corner without enough policy debates. We should be 
vigilant for this intolerance of moral populism. 
As the recession after the collapse of the Japanese bubble economy did 
not cause serious social unrest, moral populism in our case did not become 
radicalized. However, if the situation deteriorated further, the moral populism 
should have become radicalized. Depending on each society’s circumstances, 
there could be not only moral, but also nationalistic, ethnic or religious radical 
populism that brings intolerance into political discourse. We can conduct case 
studies of these types of radical populism from comparative points of view.
The intolerance of radical populism is a threat to open and free public 
opinion and democracy. So, radical populism is another systemic crisis caused 
by combined performances of the political system and mass media. As also 
seen in the crisis caused by combined performances of the economic system 
and political system, these multifunctional systemic crises are and will remain 
a chronic symptom in the age of systemic crisis. 
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